by Davide Covelli
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Picture from http://www.cgw.gr/ |
On 26 January 2015 Alexis Tsipras, leader of the major
anti-austerity party coalition in Greece, assumed the lead of the Greek
government. With his manifesto he sought to refuse explicitly and totally the
general principles on which the entire political economy of the EU has been
based until now. Tsipras’s victory speech, stating “the verdict of the Greek
people annuls today in an indisputable fashion the bailout agreements of
austerity and disaster”, provoked the German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble
to immediately reply, highlighting that “there's no question of a debt
haircut”. What clearly looms from this exchange of words is that there is an
internal struggle within the EU, exposing both ideological and national
interests.
The European institutions are designed on the principle of
balancing the different member states. The struggle for power in the EU has
always been based on a concerted form of agenda setting and on a definition of
the role of member states within a common institutional and normative
framework. This framework is an achievement that was reached through the
endorsement of multilateral treaties.
These treaties ought to be respected by the
states that signed and ratified them. Thus, even though defecting from the
European treaties is not impossible and even though there is no clear or
explicit exit option procedure, it is generally considered infeasible that
member states do not comply with the institutional framework and normative
requirements to which they agreed. What usually happens in this situation, as
in any multilateral treaty-based organization, especially when constituted by
supranational bodies, is a the emergence of firm and strong reactions against
any free-riding attempt.
However, the intervening variable of the global economic crisis is
something that challenged the internal balance and institutional stability of
the EU even more. The crisis strengthened the ties among its member states and
warranted the need for action constrained by time and efficacy. Despite the
initial optimism and the financial resources bestowed upon member states
through EU membership, the austerity policies have shown to have a negative
impact on some European economies. Indeed, the victory of the Syriza-led
coalition in Greece illustrates this situation.
Instead of solving this cleavage inside a supranational body of
the EU, thus reaffirming the unity of the European project, the clash between
supporters and critics of austerity has been brought to the bargaining level
between member states, hindering the compliance required by a multilateral
treaty. In fact, this impasse is faced through a system of alliances, where
balancing and bandwagoning behavior can create different outcomes. We can now
see a shift in EU core decision-making from mostly supranational institutions,
such as the ECB, to intergovernmental bodies, such as the European Council and
the ECOFIN.
Various actors play a
key role in polarizing the debate. Most of the European member states have
explicitly aligned themselves with the German approach of forcing Greece to
comply with the austerity milestones. However, some Southern European states
present themselves as potential Greek allies (Italy with Renzi and Spain with a
hypothetical victory of Podemos), something that will determine whether
Tsipras’s promises will remain on the purely rhetorical level or not. What is
certain, is that for Greece to put in place concrete policies without being
forced to exit the EU, Syriza will have to reassure its partners (parties and
states) of its willingness to find a compromise. Tsipras’s ability to create
balancing or bandwagoning alliances with the other states might decide the
entity of change in the general principles of the European economic policy.
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