by Ettore Togni
Different identities, visions and interests among the EU Member States
emerge from the EU Foreign and Security policy. Can be argued that, this circumstance jeopardises
the achievement of the specific political objectives by the EU.
Indeed, today the European Union holds appropriate juridical framework and political
tools to coherently act and address European and international issues, as
recognised by the Treaty of the European Union (TUE), Title V . However, despite
the main institutional and political progresses, the Foreign Policy of the
European Union is strongly undermined by two main factors that are mutually
influenced.
First: under the current legal framework, the European Council - the
highest decision-making body of the EU composed by the head of the state and
government of the 28 member states -
requires unanimity when deciding on Common Security and Defence Policy.
Thus, any country can exercise its veto and undermine a common action. In
practice, usually happens that unanimity is more likely to be perceived if at
least, the so called “Big Three” (UK, France and Germany)[1] are
politically agree to promote foreign and security actions and can thus
influence the other “minor” member states.
Second: each state has a different identity and “strategic culture”, a
distinct body of attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, as it is deeply
historically rooted[2].
An example is provided by the different vision among the UK, France and Germany.
France
and UK, countries with colonial past, have different interests to pursue in
specific geographic areas as in Africa and in Middle East and are thus more
likely to act in such specific regions. Furthermore they possess strong
economic systems that have allowed them to develop relevant military tools.
Both countries have nuclear weapons and a structured military apparatus, that
makes feasible their intentions, transforming their interests in concrete
actions. As result, the use of force is often accepted and considered as the main
tool to reach specific goals.
By contrast, the German Defence Policy is strongly linked with its
twentieth-century history, that produced a pacifist tradition and, as a
consequence, the tendence to neglect the
use of force. Furthermore, the absence of recent colonial past explains why
Germany has no particular interest in specific regions. German interests are
thus focused on the economic and trade spheres (German economy is one of the
most virtuous of Europe and of the world), and the achievement of such economic
goals is realized through civilian means (use of diplomacy and economic tools
as sanctions and embargo).
If critical issues emerge among the Big Three members, it is easy to understand how
the EU - composed by 28 states, with different history, traditions,
interests and capabilities - is unable to act coherently and to reach a unique
agreement on foreign and security issues.
This consideration, can be enlarged to the other policies which requires
unanimity in the European Council (EU membership, EU finances etc.) but is
strongly indicative of the lack of an effective Foreign and Security policy by the EU.
[1] KEUKELEIRE Stephen, “EU Foreign Policy and National Foreign
Policies”. Four further information on the “Big Three” see also CAMERON
Fraser “The Member States” and “The
EU Foreign Policy Machinery”. For a case of missed agreement among the Big
Three see the “Lybia Case” in 2011.
[2] For a discussion on strategic
culture see Snyder (1977), Jones (1990), Johnston
(1996, 1999), Gray (1999), Longhurst (2005).
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